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MENTALLY ILL PRISONERS IN THE CALIFORNIA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND
REHABILITATION: STRATEGIES FOR
IMPROVING TREATMENT AND REDUCING
RECIDIVISM
W. David Ball*
I. INTRODUCTION: CALIFORNIA IS FAILING ITS MENTALLY ILL
PRISONERS
Thousands of people with mental illness are currently serving terms in
California prisons.' These individuals receive inadequate medical and
psychiatric care, serve longer terms than the average inmate, and are
released without adequate preparation and support for their return to society.
As a result, mentally ill offenders are more likely than general-population
offenders to violate parole and return to prison. The poor treatment of
California's mentally ill prisoners burdens the judicial system, drains the
state's budget, and causes needless inmate suffering. Reform of the
California correction system's mental health treatment system is both urgent
and necessary.
California treats more of the mentally ill inside prison than outside prison.
Jails and prisons handle more people with mental illness than hospitals and
2
residential treatment centers combined. 10.5% of California state
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I. For the purposes of this paper, I only consider sex offenders and substance
abusers as part of the mentally ill population when these individuals also have an
underlying mental illness, and, where noted, when certain statistics include these
populations.
2. Stephen Raphael & Michael Stoll, Why Are So Many Americans in Prison?,
(Berkley Sch. of Pub. Policy, Working Paper, Mar. 2007), available at http://
socrates.berkeley.edu/-raphael/why%20are%20so%20many%20americans%20in%20pri
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prisoners-approximately 16,000-are treated with psychotropic
medications, while 12.5% receive in-custody therapy from a trained
professional on a regular basis.3 In fiscal year 2002-03, state-funded (Medi-
Cal) residential programs only treated 4778 people with mental illnesses.4
In the same year, a staggering 197,184 inmates received outpatient mental
health services in California jails. 5 A 2005 state report concluded that "jails
have become the primary source of treatment for the mentally ill [in
California]." 6 The state spends more than $300 million a year on jail and
son.pdf (estimating the mentally ill incarcerated population at five times the inpatient
population).
3. ALLEN J. BECK & LAURA M. MARUSCHAK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Mental Health Treatment in State Prisons 6 (2001) (reporting 2000
data) [hereinafter BECK BJS STUDY]. These figures are for enrollment in programs, not
overall demand. Given the staffing problems in California prisons, discussed infra at
notes 70-79 and accompanying text, the figures are likely to underestimate demand.
Human Rights Watch puts the population of California state prisoners with mental illness
at 23,439 as of 2003. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQuIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND
OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 18 (2003) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-
EQUIPPED]. The author notes that this number is a conservative estimate. In the most
recent order in the ongoing Coleman litigation concerning the California prison system's
mental health care, the Eastern District put the population of mentally ill inmates at
33,000. Coleman v. Schwarzenegger (Coleman II), No. Civ S-90-0520 LKK JFM P,
2007 WL 2122636 (E.D. Cal. July 23, 2007).
4. CAL. DEP'T OF MENTAL HEALTH, MEDI-CAL TREND REPORT FOR FY 1998-99
THROUGH FY 2002-03 (2003), http://www.dmh.ca.gov/SADA/SDA-Medi-Cal.asp.
These are unduplicated numbers. That is, they count individuals receiving treatment, not
program enrollment.
5. CAL. DEP'T OF MENTAL HEALTH, INVOLUNTARY DETENTION REPORTS,
INVOLUNTARY DETENTIONS IN CAL. FISCAL YEAR 2002-03 (2003), http://
www.dmh.ca.gov/SADA/SDA-Inv-Dtnt.asp. Residential programs include Adult Crisis
Residential and Adult Residential Services. These figures include some duplication,
"since the involuntary detention is done on a quarterly basis and this report is
summarized by fiscal year .... Id. at 2.
6. CAL. BD. OF CORR. & REHAB., MENTALLY ILL OFFENDERS CRIME REDUCTION
GRANT PROGRAM: OVERVIEW OF STATEWIDE EVALUATION FINDINGS (Mar. 2005),
http://www.bdcorr.ca.gov/cppd/miocrg/2005_annual-report presentation.doc [hereinafter
2005 MIOCRG STATEWIDE EVAL.].
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probation costs for mentally ill prisoners. 7  Nationally, the situation is
equally serious. The rates of mental illness among Prisoners are double to
quadruple the rate for the U.S. population at large. The U.S. Bureau of
Justice Statistics (BJS) estimates that 283,000 of the two million
incarcerated people in the U.S. (approximately 16%) suffer from serious
mental illnesses, such as schizophrenia, major depression and bipolar
disorder.9
Prisons are more likely to discipline prisoners with mental illness than
inmates in the general population. Inmates with serious illnesses are ill
equipped to abide by the myriad rules of prison life, resulting in higher rates
of disciplinary action. "While mental illness may not technically violate
prison rules, a number of the all but inevitable concomitants of mental
illness do." 10 The BJS reported in 2005 that 62.2% of mentally ill state
prison inmates had been formally charged with breaking the rules since
admission, compared to 51.9% of the general prison population."1 At the
same time, the mentally ill are more vulnerable to physical and sexual
7. CAL. BD. OF CORR. & REHAB., MENTALLY ILL OFFENDERS CRIME REDUCTION
GRANT: ANNUAL REP. TO THE LEGISLATURE 2 (June 2004), http://www.bdcorr.ca.gov/
cppd/miocrg/2004 annualreport/miocrg_2004_annual report.doc [hereinafter 2004
MIOCRG ANNUAL REP. To LEGIS.].
8. See PRESIDENT'S NEW FREEDOM COMM'N ON MENTAL HEALTH, ACHIEVING THE
PROMISE: TRANSFORMING MENTAL HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA 2 (2003),
http://mentalhealthcommission.gov/reports/Finalreport/downlaods/FinalReport.pdf
(finding that 5% to 7% of adults have a serious mental illness); see also William
Kanapaux, Guilty of Mental Illness, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES, Jan. 2004, at I (finding that U.S.
prisoners have rates of mental illness that are up to four times greater than rates for the
general population).
9. PAULA M. DITTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
MENTAL HEALTH AND TREATMENT OF INMATES AND PROBATIONERS 2 (1999) [hereinafter
DiTrON BJS STUDY]. The figure was based on prisoners who either reported a current
mental or emotional condition or who had spent at least one night in a mental hospital or
treatment program. The figures are higher for women; the study estimates that 24% of
female inmates are mentally ill.
10. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQuIPPED, supra note 3, at 59 (citing aggression,
disruptive behavior, and a refusal to follow orders due to an inability to conform one's
conduct).
1I. DITTON BJS STUDY, supra note 9, at 9.
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assault, exploitation, and extortion from other inmates.' 2 For example, 36%
of mentally ill prisoners reported being involved in altercations, compared to
25% of other inmates.
13
Mentally ill prisoners are also more likely to end up in administrative
segregation than general-population inmates, both for punitive reasons
(following disciplinary infractions) and protective reasons (following
victimization at the hands of fellow inmates). 14 Administrative segregation,
in turn, tends to exacerbate (or, in some cases, precipitate) mental illness.'
5
Therefore, mentally ill prisoners can find themselves in a vicious circle.
Mental illness leads to discipline or victimization problems, which leads to
solitary confinement and decompensation. 16 This worsens mental illness
and results in further discipline or victimization with further segregation.
Mentally ill prisoners suffer these harms for longer periods of time because
they serve, on average, fifteen months longer for the same crimes than do the
non-mentally ill. 17 Since their illnesses often prevent them from engaging in
prison programming that results in the acquisition of "good time" credits,
mentally ill prisoners also tend to serve a greater percentage of their
sentences.' 8
12. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQuIPPED, supra note 3, at 56-58. Contributing
factors include slower reaction times as a side effect of medication and social isolation
from the stigma of mental illness.
13. DlTrON BJS STUDY, supra note 9, at 9. A New York Correctional Association
Study found that 54% of prisoners in intermediate care mental health units reported
victimization, "including having property stolen and physical and/or sexual assaults."
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED, supra note 3, at 57.
14. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQuIPPED, supra note 3, at 56-59.
15. Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1216 (N.D. Cal. 1995) ("For some, SHU
[secure housing unit] confinement has severely exacerbated a previously existing mental
condition, while other inmates developed mental illness symptoms not apparent before
confinement in the SHU." (quoting Grassian Decl. at 4)).
16. Decompensation is "[t]he inability to maintain defense mechanisms in response
to stress, resulting in personality disturbance or psychological imbalance." AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 309 (4th ed. 2000).
17. DITTON BJS STUDY, supra note 9, at 8.
18. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED, supra note 3, at 126.
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California fails its mentally ill prisoners at every step. Prisons fail to
adequately screen inmates for mental illness during intake, they fail to offer
special programming or housing, they often fail to provide basic treatment,
and they fail to address special needs upon release.' 9 The result is that
mentally ill prisoners get sicker, stay longer, suffer more, and wind up back
in prison soon after their release.
These failures have plagued California's prison system for a substantial
period of time. In 1995, the federal district court in Coleman v. Wilson held
that the treatment of the mentally ill in the California corrections system was
so inadequate that it violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on "cruel
and unusual punishment. ' ' 0 The Coleman court found that the following
deficiencies violated the Eighth Amendment: (1) the lack of any screening
mechanism for mental illness, (2) inadequate mental health staffing levels,
(3) the lack of quality-assurance mechanisms for evaluating mental health
staff, (4) delays and denials of medical attention, (5) inappropriate use of
punitive measures, and (6) an "extremely deficient" records system. 21 More
than ten years later, the same problems continue to plague mental health
administration in prison.
22
The problems with mental health care are symptomatic of problems within
California's prison health care system as a whole. Judge Thelton Henderson
of the Northern District of California placed the entire prison health care
system into receivership in October 2005 in Plata v. Schwarzenegger.23 He
described the system as "broken beyond repair" and stated that the
19. See generally Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1296 (E.D. Cal. 1995).
See also Coleman v. Schwarzenegger (Coleman II), No. Civ S-90-0520 LKK JFM P,
2007 WL 2122636, at *2-4 (E.D. Cal. July 23, 2007) (screening and treatment); see also
infra notes 132-140 and accompanying text (release).
20. Coleman, 912 F. Supp. 1282. Coleman dealt with the mental health system for
all prisons except the Pelican Bay supermax prison. Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp.
1146 (N.D. Cal. 1995), established the unconstitutionality of the level of care at Pelican
Bay. See infra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
21. Coleman, 912 F. Supp. at 1296-97 (quoting Findings and Recommendations at
61).
22. Coleman II, at *2-4.
23. Plata v. Schwarzenegger, CV01-01351, 2005 WL 2932253, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct.
3, 2005).
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California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation ("CDCR") was
"incapable of successfully implementing systemic change."
24
California must provide more effective treatment for mentally ill prisoners
and prepare for their release in a way that will minimize recidivism.
Reforms must focus on the three critical stages in the penal system's
relationship with mentally ill prisoners: intake, living in prison, and release.
II. INTAKE
During intake, the prison system processes and evaluates prisoners before
transferring them to the prisons where they will serve their sentences. Intake
begins when prisoners are taken from county jails to one of several state
reception centers, such as the California Institution for Men (CIM) and the
California Institution for Women (CIW).25 Prisoners are housed at these
reception centers for at least sixty days; however, stays can last as long as
several months.26 Officials at the reception centers screen for any health
problems, including mental health problems, and they assess other needs in
order to recommend appropriate placement and programming for each
inmate. 27  In theory, prisoners transferred from a county jail to a prison
should be accompanied by their intake screen, health, and disciplinary
records.
24. Id. at *5.
25. CDCR Facilities Map, Cal. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/
Visitors/facilities map.pdf. (last visited Sept. 23, 2007). Other Reception Centers
include San Quentin, Wasco State Prison, and North Kern State Prison.
26. There are no good data on the average stay in a reception center, nor are there
statutory or judicial mandates limiting the amount of time inmates may spend there.
Since placements depend, in part, on the level of overcrowding at destination prisons,
time in reception centers is difficult to estimate. North Kern State Prison claims that it
"usually" places reception center inmates "within a 60 to 90 day period." Cal. Dep't of
Corr. & Rehab., North Kern State Prison homepage, http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/
Visitors/facprisonNKSP.html. (last visited Sept. 23, 2007). But in one infamous case,
Jon Blaylock, a reception center inmate, murdered Corrections Officer Manuel Gonzalez
after six months at a reception center. Cal. State Bd. of Corr., Independent Operations
and Incident Review Panel on the Cal. Institutions for Men 3-6 (2005),
http://www.bdcorr.ca.gov/special-reports/operational -incident -review -cim/Final%20Re
port.pdf. Blaylock was sent to CIM on June 23, 2004, referred for placement on
November 19, and was still in the reception center on January 10, 2005. Id.
27. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15 § 3075.1 (2006) (outlining the basic process); Id. §
3375 (outlining the classification process).
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Prisoners are classified according to security risk and placed in prisons
with corresponding security levels. Prison officials evaluate each prisoner
for the presence of risk factors, each of which is given a numerical weight.
28
The scores for each factor are then added to determine an inmate's
classification. 29 However, if certain overriding factors are present, an inmate
may be placed in a facility "with a security level which [sic] is not consistent
with the inmate's placement score. ' 3°  For example, "an inmate with a
history of arson shall not be housed in a facility constructed primarily of
wood," 3 1 even if his intake score might match the wooden prison's security
level. The need for special psychiatric treatment is another such factor;
inmates requiring special treatment can be placed in more heavily secured
environments than their intake scores would otherwise indicate.
32
Ideally, diagnoses, programming recommendations, and medications
would accompany prisoners as they arrive at reception centers from county
jails, but diagnoses, prescriptions, and medications often fail to accompany
prisoners at intake. 33 Pursuant to California law, county jails are required to
evaluate the mental health of their prison population, but very few of these
records are transferred from the jails to the state prison system. 34 Because so
few records are transferred, state prison reception centers must administer
redundant tests. One study estimated that 30% of all reception center
medical screens are needless duplications of county screens, costing up to $5
million per year.35 As of January 2007, county jails and the state prison
28. Id. § 3375.3. For example, the inmates are scored according to personal
background factors such as age at first arrest, age at incarceration, and length of current
sentence, as well as prior incarceration behavior such as disciplinary problems or
possession of a deadly weapon. Id.
29. Id. § 3375.1 (detailing the type of facility where an inmate will be based on the
inmate's score).
30. Id. § 3375.2(a).
31. Id. § 3375.2(a)(3).
32. Id. § 3375.2(b)(15).
33. MARCUS NIETO, CAL. RESEARCH BUREAU, HEALTH CARE IN CALIFORNIA STATE
PRISONS 17 (1998).
34. Id. at 1.
35. Id. at 16. These figures are for all medical tests, not just those for mental health.
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system have not yet worked out an orderly and reliable system for
transferring records, even though this failing was identified at least as early
as 1995, during the Coleman v. Wilson litigation.
36
California's mental health screening process, developed in response to the
Coleman lawsuit, is inadequate, notwithstanding court orders to improve it.
The current screen is designed to give mentally ill prisoners a "red flag"
during intake interviews, a more detailed psychiatric screening seventy-two
hours later, and a full psychiatric evaluation within eighteen days.37 In 2005,
however, the Plata court found that "the reception center intake process ...
fails to adequately identify and treat the health care problems of new
prisoners." 38 Specifically, even though an adequate screen should take at
least fifteen minutes to administer, "prisoners' exams in CDCR reception
centers typically last no more than seven minutes." 39  Moreover,
examinations are unlikely to be accurate because inmates are often screened
in groups without regard to confidentiality. 40  Lastly, such screens fail to
incorporate objective factors alongside self-reporting; since inmates with
acute mental illness are often unable to communicate their symptoms or
diagnoses, self-reporting alone cannot adequately determine which prisoners
are mentally ill.
4 1
36. Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1314 (E.D. Cal. 1995).
37. NIETO, supra note 33, at 19.
38. Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C01-01351, 2005 WL 2932253 at *12 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 3, 2005). Note that this refers to all screens, not just those for mental health. Mental
health screens are, however, part of the general health screen administered during
prisoner intake.
39. Id. Again, this refers to all health screens, not just mental health screens. See
also CAL. DEP'T OF CORR. & REHAB., CORRECTIONS STANDARDS AUTHORITY, SUICIDE
PREVENTION ASSESSMENT FORM, http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/DivisionsBoards/CSA/ (last
visited Mar. 5, 2008). A Suicide Prevention Assessment Form provides some insight into
the types of questions asked during mental health screens, such as health problems,
suicidal ideation, and history of hospitalization. Specifically, the form asks the screener
to note signs of depression ("inmate feels hopeless"), psychosis (agitated, responding to
voices), the seriousness of criminal charges, and indications of being under the influence
of alcohol or drugs.
40. Plata, 2005 WL 2932253, at *13.
41. Coleman, 912 F. Supp. at 1305.
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Intake screens must also account for co-occurring disorders, including, for
example, mental illness coterminous with drug abuse. Co-occurring
disorders present particular problems in penal mental health screening
because symptoms of mental illness can be masked by or misdiagnosed as
42the result of drug or alcohol abuse. Screening for drug abuse alongside
mental illness is crucial in the penal context. A state study estimated that
chemical reactions in the brain-caused primarily by the use of mind-
altering drugs--cause major mental disorders in 70% of California
prisoners.4 3 Nationwide, six in ten mentally ill state prison inmates report
being under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of their offense.44
The incidence of violent crime committed by mentally ill prisoners is no
greater than that of the general prison population, but the incidence of
violent crime by the mentally ill who also abuse drugs and alcohol is far
greater. 45 Despite these findings, there are few drug treatment programs in
46county jails, and no drug treatment programs at CDCR reception centers.
The shortcomings of California's intake screens are compounded by their
low rate of administration. A national BJS study analyzed mental health
screening for prisoners at state-operated facilities, facilities under joint state
and local authority, and private facilities at which at least 50% of patients
•• 47
were inmates held for state authorities. This study found that 67.7% of
state-operated facilities nationwide (1055 of 1558 facilities) conducted
mental health screenings at intake, compared to only 58.1% (50 out of 86) in
48California. In addition, 63.5% (990 out of 1558 facilities) of national
42. NAT'L COMM'N ON CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE, POSITION STATEMENT:
MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES IN CORRECTIONAL SETTINGS (1992), http://www.ncchc.org/
resources/statements/mentalhealth.html.
43. NIETO, supra note 9, at 7.
44. DIrrON BJS STUDY, supra note 8, at 7.
45. Eric Silver et al., Assessing Violence Risk Among Discharged Psychiatric
Patients: Toward an Ecological Approach, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 237, 238 (1999),
available at http://www.springerlink.com/(a3z4blvb5zk2ze4534j I yr3h)/app/home/
contribution.asp?referrer-parent&backto=issue,5,8;joumal,41,1 38;linkingpublicationresu
Its,1:104390,1.
46. NIETO, supra note 33, at 1-2.
47. BECK BJS STUDY, supra note 3, at 5.
48. Id.
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facilities conducted psychiatric assessments, compared to only 40.7% (35
out of 86 facilities) in California.49
A functional intake process would provide mentally ill prisoners with any
necessary care during their stay at reception centers. Early identification of
mental illness enables early treatment, which is a hallmark of effective
treatment. Early treatment is also constitutionally required. The Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment requires the
prison system to provide mental health care "before inmates suffer
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." 50 Inmates are typically held at
reception centers for at least two months, but efforts to increase the number
of reception center mental health treatment beds has met stiff local
opposition.
5 1
Finally, conditions at reception centers must be improved and
overcrowding must be reduced. For example, conditions at the CIM's
Sycamore Hall are "deplorable," according to a 2005 independent panel
investigating the murder of a corrections officer by an inmate.52 The panel
noted "heavy cobwebs, broken windows, fecal matter on the walls, [and]
accumulated filth and food on the floor . . . . The "cramped and
dilapidated conditions" have led to operational practices that violate
security, and, despite these conditions, "the staff continues to process over
600 inmates per week.' 54 The panel recommended that the CDCR "evaluate
the number of inmates being processed to determine how many inmates can
be safely processed and housed at CIM.
55
49. Id.
50. Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1305 (E.D. Cal. 1995).
51. Mason Stockstill, Chino Prison Mentally-Ill Inmate Plan Reintroduced, DAILY
BULL., Mar. 31, 2006, available at http://www.dailybulletin.com/news/ci_3661249.
52. CAL. STATE BD. OF CORRECTIONS, INDEPENDENT OPERATIONS AND INCIDENT
REVIEW PANEL ON THE CALIFORNIA INSTITUTIONS FOR MEN 12, http://www.bdcorr.ca.gov/
special reports/operational-incident review-cim/Final%20Report.pdf.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 16.
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II1. LIVING IN PRISON
Once prisoners with mental illness are assigned to prisons, they must
receive necessary counseling and medication. At a minimum, mentally ill
prisoners need to get their prescribed medications regularly. Too often, drug
treatment is interrupted when prisoners are transferred between prisons or
when lockdown interferes with medication delivery. Prisons should also be
responsive to changes in prisoners' mental health and should screen for in-
prison onset of mental illness. Finally, special disciplinary procedures,
housing, and programming should also be considered in order to improve
diagnostic and behavioral outcomes.
Mentally ill prisoners are currently classified into three categories in
an attempt to match levels of service to medical needs. The first category,
the Correctional Clinical Case Management System (CCCMS), consists of
inmates who are capable of living in the general population.56 CCCMS
inmates are prescribed medication and counseling and meet with their
clinical case manager at least once every ninety days.58  The second
category, the Enhanced Outpatient Program (EOP), consists of prisoners
"who are unable to function or care for themselves" in the general prison
population "or who are acutely ill or decompensating. ' '59 The EOP provides
regular medication review, meetings with a case manager at least once a
week, and ten hours of structured therapy activities per week. 60 The third
category consists of "patients in crisis" who are housed in a Mental Health
Crisis Bed in an infirmary on a short-term basis (ten days maximum).
6 1
Acutely ill patients who continue to remain "in crisis" beyond ten days are
transferred to the custody of the Department of Mental Health, which
provides residential treatment to prisoners until they are ready to return to
prison.
62
56. NIETO, supra note 33, at 39.
57. Id.
58. STEvEN FAMA, ET AL., PRISON LAW OFFICE, CALIFORNIA STATE PRISON
HANDBOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO PRISON & PAROLE LAW 262 (2001).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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While this classification system could, in theory, be useful in delivering
resources where they are most needed, in practice the system fails to deliver
adequate care to prisoners in need. The EOP, for example, currently serves
1-2% of the state prison population, falling far short of demand.6 3 In 2002,
San Quentin's EOP was operating at 385% of capacity, while the Valley
State Prison for Women's EOP was at 156% of capacity. 64 Prison policies
require transfers into the EOP to be completed within thirty days of a
recommendation by medical staff, but "most administrators acknowledge
transfers can be delayed far longer ...."65
Over the past decade, judges in several lawsuits have found that the
CDCR's grossly inadequate health care provision violates the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. 66 In 1995, two
class action suits were filed on behalf of mentally ill prisoners. In Madrid v.
Gomez the plaintiff class was limited to mentally ill inmates at the
"supermax" facility at Pelican Bay, while in Coleman v. Wilson the
plaintiff class represented mentally ill prisoners in the rest of the prison
68system. The state lost both suits. As a result, mental health reforms were
ordered but not adequately implemented. The CDCR recently lost another
suit, Plata v. Schwarzenegger, in which the plaintiffs alleged that the
provision of prison health care is so grossly inadequate as to constitute cruel
and unusual punishment.
69
The prison healthcare system thus finds itself preparing to be administered
through court-supervised receivership. Without addressing the serious and
systemic problems with the administration of mental health care, the CDCR
63. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED, supra note 3, at 98.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQuIPPED, supra note 3, at 164-68; NIETO,
supra note 33, at 7-8. The grim picture is also substantiated by a number of both state-
funded and privately funded studies of the system. See also Little Hoover Commission,
Cal. State Gov't Org. & Economy Comm'n, Being There: Making a Commitment to
Mental Health 157 (2000), http://www.lhc.ca.gov/lhcdir/reportI57.pdf.
67. Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282 (E.D. Cal. 1995).
68. Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1214 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
69. Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C01-1351, 2005 WL 2932253, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
Oct 3, 2005).
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faces a future of more lawsuits and further judicial control. The prison
mental health system must address several problems, including chronic
staffing shortages, the lack of quality control and managerial oversight of
mental health care providers, an emphasis on security over treatment (which
is counterproductive for both security and treatment), a badly outdated and
unusable data system, and a dysfunctional medication disbursement system.
Correcting these problems will help stabilize the conditions of mentally ill
prisoners, which, in turn, will both reduce suffering and improve long-term
prognoses.
A. Staff Shortages
California prisons suffer from inadequate hiring and inadequate retention,
each of which contributes to the other. Understaffing drives people from the
workforce and high turnover makes recruitment more difficult.
Psychiatric staff levels have been inadequate for decades. The 1995
Coleman opinion found not only that current psychiatric positions were
understaffed but that several studies for the prior decade had noted shortages
as well. 70 A 1998 study found system-wide vacancies of 14% among EOP
staff.71  Pelican Bay State Prison, which houses the CDCR's most
incorrigible offenders, opened in December of 1989 without a single
psychiatrist on staff.72 A staff psychiatrist at the California Medical Facility
stated that "turnover is huge" and "asserted that the average stay for mental
health staff in the prison was a mere six months." 73 Staff shortages extend to
the prison health care system as a whole, where some prisons have an 80%
vacancy rate for nursing staff.74 According to one federal district court, the
15% vacancy rate for physicians does not account for "the additional
significant percentage of incompetent doctors who need to be replaced.,
7 5
70. Coleman, 912 F. Supp. at 1306-07.
71. NIETO, supra note 33, at 39.
72. Madrid, 889 F. Supp. at 1214.
73. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED, supra note 3, at 98. The California
Medical Facility in Vacaville is a "centrally-located medical and psychiatric institution
for the health care needs of the male felon population in California's prisons." Cal. Dep't
of Corr. & Rehab., California Medical Facility homepage, http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/
Visitors/Facilities/CMF.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2007).
74. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQuIPPED, supra note 3, at 98.
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The remote location of most prisons makes recruitment difficult, as does•76
the low quality of services and the unprofessional environment. Pay is also
an issue. Nurses working in the prison system make between 20% and 40%
less than they would in the private sector,77 and 29% less than Medical
Technical Assistants, corrections officers who perform duties "that could be
performed by licensed nurses .... , 78 The pay differential between medical
staff and corrections officers has been cited as another barrier to the
recruitment of qualified medical staff.7 9 Insufficient staff levels not only
degrade care, they also increase costs. If no care is available in prison,
inmates are sent to hospitals accompanied by corrections officers. The
transportation costs alone of sending prisoners to hospitals was $875 per
prisoner per trip in 1998.80
B. Lack of Quality Control and Management
Despite ample evidence that prisoners are receiving grossly substandard
care, there is very little management or supervision of the provision of
medical care. This lack of management makes it almost impossible to fire,
retrain, or reassign poorly performing staff.
The court in Plata v. Schwarzenegger found that the CDCR "lacks an
adequate system to manage and supervise medical care. ' 81 There is "a
culture of non-accountability and non-professionalism" in the Health Care
Services Division (HCSD).8' In September 2004, the HCSD was ordered to
implement quality management of physicians but "failed to come close" to
doing so. The system suffers from "operational silo" syndrome, meaning
75. Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C01-1351, 2005 WL 2932253, at *11 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 3, 2005).
76. NIETO, supra note 33, at 44.
77. Plata, 2005 WL 2932253, at *11.
78. NIETO, supra note 33, at 45.
79. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED, supra note 3, at 131.
80. NIETO, supra note 33, at 32.
81. Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C01-1351, 2005 WL 2932253, at *3 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 3, 2005).
82. Id.at*10.
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there is no comprehensive, system-wide oversight; rather, there is a series of
prisons accountable only to their individual wardens. 84 Further, the CDCR
has a staggering 80% vacancy rate in the higher level of management of its
HCSD.85 Receivership is the court's attempt to improve the situation; the
medical service workers' union, which is unaffiliated with the prison guards'
union, supports receivership.
86
C. Inadequate Information Technology
Data management in the HCSD is "practically non-existent,"87 yet patient
treatment, quality control, and management are almost impossible to
implement without adequate information. Systems to track patient follow-
up do not work, 88 and medical records in most prisons are "either in a
shambles or non-existent."8 9 Doctors often have to open new patient files
because they cannot find existing records.90  Medical records are not
transferred from jails,9 Farole officers, or from other prisons (in the case of
inter-prison transfers). Doug Peterson, head of health care at the California
State Prison at Sacramento, states that the data deficit is "horrible as a
management tool, which affects inmate care. It's harder to monitor whether
they're getting what they're supposed to be getting. 92 That is, not only are
prisoners not getting the care they need, managers are unable to diagnose
83. Id. at *2.
84. Id. at *3.
85. Id. at *5.
86. Id. at *33.
87. Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C01-1351, 2005 WL 2932253, at *4 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 3, 2005).
88. Id.
89. Id. at * 14. Indeed, the lack of basic record keeping means that the problem is not
just a lack of information technology, but a lack of information gathering itself.
90. Id.
91. See NIETO, supra note 33, at 16.
92. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED, supra note 3, at 102.
2007]
Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. XXIV: I
which staff should be reassigned. At a minimum, adequate records would
help administrators to give prisoners timely access to drugs and treatment.
The CDCR's information technology has been notoriously inadequate for
years. In 1992, the CDCR committed itself to the California state legislature
to improve health care delivery, standardization, and automation via, inter
alia, a Health Information Project.93 CDCR officials later blamed their
failure to implement these reforms on the state procurement process.94 In
1995, Coleman noted "extremely deficient" record keeping in the system at
large,95 while Madrid described Pelican Bay records as "nothing short of
disastrous" and "outrageously disorganized. 9 6  A 1998 study found that
medical records were compiled by hand.97  In 2004, the Corrections
Independent Review Panel, convened by Governor Schwarzenegger and
chaired by former Governor Deukrneijian, deemed the system's information
technology "inadequate."
98
D. Lack of Coordination with and Cooperation from Corrections Officers
Corrections officers (COs) are an untapped resource in an area that
desperately needs more resources. COs not only administer medications and
accompany prisoners to medical clinics, but can also serve as a potential
early warning system for changes in prisoners' behavior and mental health.
Improvements in mental health treatment would be much easier with
cooperation from COs, but, at the very least, COs should not make things
worse.
COs currently play too large a role in determining treatment for mentally
ill prisoners, making medical decisions based primarily on security
considerations. According to Dr. Michael Friedman, director of medical
93. NIETO, supra note 33, at 43.
94. Id.
95. Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1314 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (quoting Findings
and Recommendations at 61).
96. Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp 1146, 1203 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (quoting Start Decl.
at 89).
97. NIETO, supra note 33, at 46.
98. REPORT OF THE CORRECTIONS INDEPENDENT REVIEW PANEL, CAL. PERFORMANCE
REVIEW, REFORMING CORRECTIONS 233 (June 2004), http://cpr.ca.gov/report/indrpt/
corr/pdf/from7to I I.pdf (presented to Governor Schwarzenegger).
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care at Soledad Prison, "[t]he system . . . is totally corrupted" because
"[n]onmedical staff are making medical decisions . . . everything is about
security, not about how we look after the inmates." 99 Because corrections
officers have daily contact with inmates, they could provide timely referrals
for mental health treatment; however, because COs often fear that prisoners
are just faking their symptoms, referrals often are not made until prisoners
are grossly psychotic.' The Madrid decision noted that mentally ill
inmates who were not displaying violent or disruptive behavior could remain
untreated for "months" despite regular contact with COs.10 1 Madrid also
found that COs tended to impose "a higher referral threshold than
appropriate . . . . [C]ustody staff essentially make medical judgments that
should be reserved for clinicians, and some inmates are not given
appropriate early treatment that could prevent or alleviate a severe
psychiatric disorder."' 1 2  COs are insufficiently trained to make these
judgments about treatment. They get a mere three hours of training in
"unusual inmate behavior," which is occasionally supplemented by
discretionary programs administered by their local prisons. 103 Medical
caregivers also report that COs display a lack of respect for the caregivers,
interfering with their ability to make decisions in a clinical context.'
04
While COs are reluctant to refer mentally ill inmates for treatment, they
are overly ready to commit mentally ill inmates to administrative
segregation. Mentally ill prisoners are disproportionately represented in
administrative segregation; in July 2002, 31.85% of the California
administrative segregation population was on the mental health caseload. 10 5
At the Valley State Prison for Women, the figures were even higher; 65.91%
99. James Sterngold, Grim Reality of Prison Health Care, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 16,
2005, at A 15.
100. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED, supra note 3, at 75-76.
101. Madrid, 889 F. Supp. at 1217.
102. Id. at 1219.
103. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQuIPPED, supra note 3, at 77.
104. Plata v. Schwarzenegger, C01-01351, 2005 WL 2932253, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Oct.
3, 2005). Note that this refers to all medical treatment, not psychiatric treatment in
particular.
105. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQuIPPED, supra note 3, at 148.
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of the prisoners in secure housing were mentally ill. 1°6 Mental health care in
administrative segregation is limited to drug treatment only. Without
therapy, face-to-face contact, and exposure to normal routines,
administrative segregation pushes mentally ill inmates towards
decompensation. At Mule Creek State Prison, for example, half of the
acute-care "crisis beds" came from the EOP administrative segregation
population.10 7 In other words, mentally ill prisoners who were placed in
administrative segregation for protective or disciplinary purposes then
decompensated to a point where they required transfers to "crisis bed"
treatment.' 08 "The requirement of isolation [imposed by administrative
segregation] flies in the face of the medically accepted fact that most
mentally disordered people need to interact with others."'10 9 This treatment
creates a cycle in which the mentally ill find themselves "stuck at the
bottom"" 0 with little chance to leave administrative segregation because
"most people in isolation will fall apart."' I
Decompensating prisoners, such as those in administrative segregation,
sometimes become violent. One defense attorney reported that some
seriously mentally ill clients of hers have been "criminally prosecuted for
their prison conduct" and that this prosecution "in a number of cases has led
to them receiving life sentences under California's three strikes law."
11 2
Fear of decompensating prisoners can make guards overreact, sometimes
with horrifying results. Madrid cited the example of a mentally ill inmate
being placed in hot water long enough to give him severe bums. 113 COs
took the prisoner, who was African-American, into the infirmary and said to
106. Id. at 148.
107. Id. at 160.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 155.
110. Id. at 154.
"'lHUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED, supra note 3, at 149 (quoting Human Rights
Watch interview with Sandra Schank, staff psychiatrist, Mule Creek State Prison,
California, July 19, 2002).
112 Id. at 66.
113. Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1166-67 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
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the nurse on duty that it "looks like we're going to have a white boy before
this is through .... ,,' 4After the prisoner was removed from the water, the
nurse testified that "from just below his buttocks, his skin had peeled off and
was hanging in large clumps around his legs, which had turned white with
some redness."'"l 5 The Madrid court concluded that the use of force was not
isolated but was "an affirmative management strategy to permit the use of
excessive force for the purposes of punishment and deterrence."' 1 6 The
evidence presented "paint[ed] a picture of a prison that all too often uses
force, not only in good faith efforts to restore and maintain order, but also
for the very purpose of inflicting punishment and pain."
117
E. Medication's Problems
Among other effects, abrupt withdrawal from psychotropic medications
can lead to relapses, panic attacks, and psychosis.' Yet many prisoners
face precisely these terrifying symptoms because the medication delivery
system in California prisons is broken. The management of prison
pharmacy operations is "unbelievably poor." 119 At the San Quentin prison,
there is "no system" to identify when prescriptions for critical medicines
expire.' Patients wait two to three weeks for refills, which places many
inmates at an unnecessarily increased risk. Delays in distribution of
medicine can cause prisoners to lose the mental capacity needed to request
medications.' 22  Prison policies state that prescriptions must travel with
114. Id. at 1167.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1199.
117. Id. at 1200.
118. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQuIPPED, supra note 3, at 118-19.
119. Plata v. Schwarzenegger, CV01-01351, 2005 WL 2932253, at *16 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 3, 2005) (quoting Dr. Puisis).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQuIPPED, supra note 3, at 120 (quoting Human
Rights Watch interview with J.G. California State Prison, Sacramento, July 18, 2002).
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prisoners who are being transferred from one facility to another, but "[i]n
practice, however, the prisons do not consistently transfer prescriptions
along with the inmates, resulting in large quantities of medication being
thrown out rather than administered."' 123 Prescriptions from other prisons are
routinely disregarded. 1
24
For those prisoners who do get their medications, the system provides
disincentives for their use. Side effects to some psychotropic medications
are quite substantial, 125 even when taken as directed. However, California
has done little to monitor and ameliorate side effects other than those
-. . 126
relating to heat sensitivity. Certain medications, for example, induce
anxiety as a side effect unless taken just before sleep, yet nighttime
deliveries for these medications are not permitted.1 27  California also
prevents prisoners on psychotropic drugs from participating in work-
furlough programs. This creates an incentive for prisoners to discontinue
use precisely as they increase contact with society at large. 128 Given that
these drugs are medically necessary and readily available outside prison,
such a policy is completely nonsensical. Prisoners who opt out of taking
drugs cannot be forced to take them without officials following a byzantine
process, 129 yet COs and health officials make little effort to convince
prisoners who have decided to stop taking their medicine to reconsider.
1 30
123. Plata, 2005 WL 2932253, at *16.
124. Id.
125. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED, supra note 3, at 120.
126. Id. at 124.
127. Id. at 117-18.
128. Id. at 120 (identifying potential side effects including "excessive saliva, a
powerful clamping of the mouth, severe back and neck cramping, and spasms").
129. FAMA, ET AL., supra note 58, at 265-66 (citing a California court's holding in
Keyhea v. Rushem, 223 Cal. Rptr. 746, 755 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) that "prisoners have the
right to a judicial hearing and determination" and requiring the prison to follow spedific
procedures when any involuntary drugging is undertaken and when officials hope to
continue the involuntary drugging beyond seventy-two hours).
130. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED, supra note 3, at 125 ("When prisoners
refuse to take their medications, little effort is devoted to coaxing them to change their
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These problems are not new. Systemic problems with refill delays, a lack of
medication continuity upon transfer, and a failure to monitor side effects
were identified as problems as early as 1995 during the Coleman
litigation.
13 1
IV. RELEASE
For nearly all mentally ill prisoners, release is inevitable. 132 The
CDCR should therefore plan for re-entry of these prisoners as early as
possible. 133 Approximately 60,000 prisoners are released in California each
year, all of whom are placed on parole. 134 Of these approximately 66,000
parolees, approximately 12,000 have "a documented history of psychiatric
problems." 35 Parole Outpatient Clinics (POCs) provide assistance to 9000
minds. At most mental health staff may visit a prisoner's cell front and briefly try to
convince him or her to take their medications.").
131. Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1309 (E.D. Cal. 1995).
132. JEREMY TRAVIS, BUT THEY ALL COME BACK: FACING THE CHALLENGE OF
PRISONER REENTRY, xvii (Urban Institute Press 2005) ("[T]he iron law of imprisonment.
• . [is] that they all come back. Except for those few individuals who die in custody,
every person we send to prison returns to live with us.").
133. Prison release dates are known with some degree of certainty. Unfortunately,
jails do not lend themselves as easily to careful release planning, because so many
mentally ill inmates are there as a part of pretrial detention, either because they have
failed to post bail or because they pose a danger to the community. Accordingly, many
mentally ill inmates are released from jail with little or no advance notice, either as a
result of posting bail or as a result of getting credit for "time served" at an arraignment.
134. The 2001 report, using data from 2000, states that there were 56,000 people
released into parole. See California Prisoners and Parolees (2001), http://
www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/OffenderInformationServicesBranch/Annual/Cal
Pris/CALPRISd200 I.pdf.
135. CAL. STATE LEGIS. ANALYST'S OFFICE, ANNUAL ANALYSIS OF BUDGET BILL,
JUDICIARY & CRIMINAL JUSTICE: LINKING MENTALLY ILL OFFENDERS TO COMMUNITY
CARE D- 14-15 (2000), http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis_2000/crimjustice/
cj_2_cc mentallyillanlOO.html_i. Data are somewhat difficult to come by, since the
state changed parole databases within the last five years. A 2004 study commissioned by
the CDCR provides another estimate: 48,291 parolees were under some sort of mental
health supervision between July 2001 and December 2003, for an average of 19,316 per
year (of whom 79.8% were CCCMS, 14.2% EOP, and 6% unclassified). See
NEUROPSYCHIATRIC INST., UNIV. OF CAL., Los ANGELES, THIRD ANNUAL REPORT ON THE
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of these individuals.1 36 If intake diagnoses prisoners' mental illnesses and
the prison sentence treats them, release should prepare prisoners to treat their
condition outside prison and, one hopes, avoid further incarceration.
Recidivism can be reduced if re-entry is planned, if intervention is front-
loaded, and if parole officers embrace the harm reduction principle (a
public-health-oriented rather than criminal-justice-oriented approach to
dealing with parole infractions). Investments in release programs should
ultimately generate a virtuous cycle; when prisoner recidivism decreases,
more resources are freed for treatment within the prison system and within
non-penal mental health institutions.
The most effective post-release programs follow the integrated services
model, concentrating on the period immediately following release and
coordinating multiple services such as mental health, parole, therapeutic
treatment for drug and alcohol addiction, housing, and employment."' For
example, prisoners about to be released should have an adequate supply of
medication (at least seventy-two hours' worth), some form of housing, and
contacts with a coordinated team of correctional and social services staff.
Such efforts will aid the recently-released prisoners as they enter parole,
seek permanent housing, pursue job training and employment, enroll in drug
and alcohol abuse counseling, and receive restored government benefits such
as Temporary Aid to Needy Families, Medi-Cal, Medicaid, Social Security,
and State and Social Security Disability Insurance. 138 Treatment should
MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES CONTINUUM PROGRAM OF THE CALIFORNIA DEPARMENT OF
CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION-PAROLE DIVISION 14 (2005) [hereinafter 2005
ANNUAL MHSCP REPORT].
136. 2005 ANNUAL MHSCP REPORT, supra note 135, at 14. These numbers must be
taken with a grain of salt; sex offenders are required to report to POCs, even if they are at
low risk of reoffending. Assuming that the released prisoners reflect the general
incidence of mental illness found in the prison population-10.5%, to use the most
conservative estimate-this means that almost 7,000 prisoners with serious mental
illnesses will be released on average per year. According to a 2004 report, parolees
released from the EOP program are given highest priority for treatment, followed by
those from Mental Health Crisis Beds, inmates released from the Department of Mental
Health (e.g. inmates from the CONREP program), and inmates classified as CCCMS. Id
at 8.
137. Milton Marks, "LITrLE HOOVER" COMM'N ON CAL. STATE GOV'T ORG. &
ECONOMY, Rep. No. 172, BACK TO THE COMMUNITY: SAFE & SOUND PAROLE POLICIES, X
(2003), available at http://www.lhc.ca.gov/lhcdir/reportl72.html [hereinafter LITTLE
HOOVER].
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employ cognitive behavioral techniques, emphasize positive reinforcement,
use actuarial (population-based) assessments of risk, and be based in the
community. 39 It is not enough to threaten to be "tough" on parolees,
particularly those with mental illnesses, because threats "do not target for
change the known predictors of recidivism.''
140
Some release programs for mentally ill prisoners have shown promising
results, but, system-wide, too many mentally ill parolees are returning to
prison. And too many of those are returning for reasons unrelated to the
commission of new crimes. According to a national 2002 study, 22% of
parolees self-reported that their parole was revoked for failure to report, 16%
said their parole was revoked for drug violations, and 18% reported other
reasons such as failure to meet financial or employment conditions. 141 In
San Francisco, a staggering 94% of mentally ill offenders on parole have
their parole revoked and are returned to prison. 142 Ironically, more intense
supervision without treatment has been shown to lead to higher rates of
revocation, but when more supervision is coupled with treatment, recidivism
has been shown to drop 20-30%. 143 A zero-tolerance policy for illegal drug
use could be the common thread; parolees need treatment, not just
supervision, if they are to avoid relapses into drug abuse.
144
The CDCR should aim to reduce parole revocations that are a function of
untreated mental illness, with an understanding that this focus in no way
jeopardizes its mission to protect public safety. A number of legal
mechanisms already give parole officers the authority to send dangerous
138. Mentally ill prisoners report high rates of homelessness, unemployment, and
drug use prior to incarceration. DITToN BJS STUDY, supra note 9, at 5.
139. Joan Petersilia, What Works in Prisoner Re-Entry: Reviewing and Questioning
the Evidence, FED. PROBATION, Sept. 2004, at 3-4, available at http://uscourts.gov/
fedprob/September_2004/whatworks.html.
140. Id. at 4.
141. JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISONER
REENTRY 149 (Oxford Univ. Press 2003); see also SONJA SHIELD, CTR. ON JUVENILE AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, ADDRESSING GAPS IN POST-RELEASE SERVICES FOR MENTALLY ILL
OFFENDERS: ONE COMMUNITY'S RESPONSE 4 (2003), http://www.cjcj.org/pdf/
mentally_ill.pdf.
142. SHIELD, supra note 141, at 2.
143. PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME, supra note 141, at 84.
144. SHIELD, supra note 141,at5.
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mentally ill parolees back to prison. As the standard form for conditions of
parole states,
[w]hen the Board of Prison Terms determines, based upon psychiatric
reasons, that you pose a danger to yourself or others, the Board may,
if necessary for psychiatric treatment, order your placement in a
community treatment facility or state prison or may revoke your
parole and order your return to prison.
Parolees can be temporarily returned to prison under an "Emergency
Transfer" if they meet the criteria for mental illness and if they "cannot
receive necessary psychiatric treatment pending a hearing."' 4  Parole
officers are required to report to the Parole Board if a parolee's mental
condition deteriorates "such that the parolee is likely to engage in future
criminal behavior." 147 Parolees must then be returned to prison upon a
finding of future criminal behavior. Finally, a parolee can be returned to
prison if he or she has a mental disorder that "substantially impairs his or her
ability to maintain himself or herself in the community" and "necessary
psychiatric treatment cannot be obtained in the community."
148
As an alternative to parole, prisoners with acute mental illness should
continue to be released into treatment through the Mentally Disordered
Offender (MDO) program. A prisoner is classified as an MDO if (1) he or
she has a severe mental disorder that is not in remission, (2) the disorder was
either one of the causes of or an aggravating factor in a crime involving
force or violence, and (3) he or she poses a substantial danger of physical
harm to others. 149  When an MDO's prison term expires, he or she is
released into inpatient treatment at a state mental hospital as a condition of
parole.150
145. FAMA, ETAL., supra note 58, at app. 10-10-A.
146. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15 § 2605(c) (2006).
147. Id. § 2616(a)14.
148. Id. § 2637(b)6. Note, however, that the legality of the portions of § 2637 that
apply to sexually violent predators is in dispute. A California state Court of Appeals held
that it is a violation of due process to hold a prisoner beyond his release date based solely
on a finding that he has a mental disorder and is in need of treatment. See Terhune v.
Superior Court, 65 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 864 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1998).
149. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 2960-2981 (West 2000).
150. FAMA, ETAL., supra note 53, at 407.
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The MDO program provides flexibility in the treatment of mentally ill
offenders once they are released from prison. MDOs can be treated on an
inpatient basis for the duration of parole. If, at the end of parole, an MDO
continues to have severe mental disorders, and if these disorders are not in
remission or cannot be kept in remission without treatment, or if the MDO
continues to pose a substantial danger of physical harm to others, 151 the
Department of Mental Health (DMH) can refer the case to the local District
Attorney, who will then initiate proceedings for civil commitment.1 52 If an
MDO can be safely and effectively treated on an outpatient basis, however,
the DMH will recommend treatment in the Conditional Release Program
(CONREP).' 5 3 CONREP provides full mental health services, including
individual and group therapies, substance abuse screenings, and
psychological assessments. 154 Participants who do not comply with their
CONREP treatment plans can be returned to state hospital inpatient status.'
55
California should ultimately take a few programs and implement them
statewide, or expand existing grant-making programs so that local
jurisdictions receive funding for the programs they develop. In either case,
the state should require regular reports on parolee outcomes from local
jurisdictions. More information is necessary to diagnose shortcomings and
to shift managerial and material resources to where they are most needed.
The following programs demonstrate some of the key features of a
successful post-release approach, although none operate on the scale
necessary to meet the statewide demand.
A. The Mental Health Services Continuum Program: Transition from
Prison to Parole
The Mental Health Services Continuum Program (MHSCP) is a statewide
program designed to ease mentally ill inmates' transition from prison to
151. CAL. PEN. CODE § 2970. See also People v. Beeson, 99 Cal. App. 4th 1393 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2002) (describing an MDO commitment proceeding).
152. FAMA, ETAL., supra note 58, at 411.
153. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 4360 (West 1998).
154. Cal. Dep't of Mental Health, Forensic Conditional Release Program (CONREP),
http://www.dmh.cahwnet.gov/Services and Programs/ForensicServices/CONREP/defa
ult.asp (last visited Mar. 2, 2008).
155. Id.
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parole and thereby reduce recidivism. 156 It serves parolees released on or
after October 1, 2000.157 The program aims to assess inmates' pre-release
needs, assist with eligibility and applications for public assistance, provide
enhanced post-release mental health treatment, improve continuity of care
from prison to the community, assist participants with re-integration into the
community, and standardize care across all four of California's parole
regions.
Social workers under the aegis of the regional Transitional Case
Management Program coordinate the care of program participants,
beginning with an in-prison face-to-face assessment within ninety days of
the inmate's Earliest Possible Release Date (EPRD).159 The assessment is
then updated within thirty days of the EPRD and the information is entered
into the Parole Automated Tracking System database. 160 A first post-release
appointment is also scheduled within three business days for EOP parolees
and seven business days for stable, functioning CCCMS parolees.1
61
A 2005 study of MHSCP participants from July 1, 2001 to December 31,
2003 showed promising results. 62 Participants in the program were much
more likely than non-participants to attend Parole Outpatient Clinics (POCs)
and less likely to return to prison. 63 Pre-release assessment alone appeared
to be an important factor in improving post-release POC attendance: 66.2%
of assessed inmates attended at least one POC session, compared to 50.8%
156. 2005 ANNUAL MHSCP REPORT, supra note 135, at 1.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1-2. Again, Enhanced Outpatient Program ("EOP") parolees are diagnosed
with acute onset of a serious mental disorder with delusional thinking, hallucination, etc.
FAMA ET AL., supra note 58, at 262. Correctional Clinical Case Management System
("CCCMS") parolees are diagnosed with mental illness but stable functioning. See supra
notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
162. 2005 ANNUAL MHSCP REPORT, supra note 135, at 2 (observing that "the
percentage of inmates who are assessed has increased over time").
163. Id.
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of non-assessed inmates. 164  Assessed inmates also attended more POC
sessions, on average, than non-assessed inmates did, a mean of 4.4 versus
3.3.165 Most significantly, pre-release assessments were associated with a
19% reduction in the likelihood of being returned to custody in the first
twelve months of release, and having at least one POC contact was
associated with a 37% reduction in recidivism risk. 66  The 2005 study
estimated that cost savings from the program are substantial. Based on
reduced incarceration days, pre-release assessments save $2,194 for each
EOP parolee and $712 for each CCCMS parolee.' 67 Parolees attending at
least one POC session saved the CDCR $5998 per EOP parolee and $3224
per CCCMS parolee.'
68
MHSCP's main shortcoming is that the program does not reach all
eligible prisoners. Recent statistics show that only 57% of the eligible pool
of released prisoners were assessed in a face-to-face meeting prior to
release.' 69  The earlier an inmate appears on the Offender Information
Services (OIS) list of soon-to-be-released inmates, the more likely he or she
will be assessed face-to-face. 63.5% of MHSCP-eligible inmates
appearing on the OIS list more than forty-five days before their release date
were assessed face-to-face.' 71 But only 17.8% of MHSCP-eligible inmates
who appeared on the OIS list within forty-five days of release got a face-to-
face assessment. 72 Assessment rates have been improving recently, 173 but it
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 3.
167. Id.
168. 2005 ANNUAL MHSCP REPORT, supra note 135, at 3.
169. Id. at 2 (observing that "the percentage of inmates who are assessed has
increased over time").
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at2.
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remains to be seen whether the program can continue to reach more and
more prisoners.
B. Mentally Ill Offender Crime Reduction Grant Programs
In 1998, the California Legislature authorized the Mentally Ill Offender
Crime Reduction Grant (MIOCRG) program to fund innovative local
programs targeting mentally ill offenders. MIOCRG currently provides
more than $80 million to thirty projects in twenty-six of California's fifty-
eight counties. 175 To set the program's priorities, county service providers
and law enforcement officials were asked what resources they needed to
accommodate returning mentally ill offenders. Their responses included (1)
better prison discharge planning, (2) more housing options, (3) increased
treatment capacity, and (4) interagency coordination. 176  The MIOCRG
programs are funded with those priorities in mind.
Though the funding is disbursed at the state level, all MIOCRG programs
are administered at the county level. The state encouraged counties to
experiment with various forms of collaborative programs as a means of
learning which approaches are most effective in decreasing recidivism
among the mentally ill. 177 Because mental health services are provided
through counties, local administration allows community stakeholders a
greater opportunity to coordinate care. Two-thirds of countyPrograms draw
on the Assertive Community Treatment (ACT) model, in which a
multidisciplinary group of providers services clients as a team and is
available around the clock. A study aggregating data from ACT programs
showed positive results. 179  Participants scored higher on the improved
Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) Scale, a common psychiatric
assessment tool that measures social, psychological, and occupational
174. CAL. PEN. CODE § 6045 (West 2000).
175. 2005 MIOCRG STATEWIDE EVAL., supra note 6, at 1.
176. 2004 MIOCRG ANNUAL REP. TO LEGIS., supra note 7, at 4.
177. Id. at 1.
178. 2005 MIOCRG STATEWIDE EVAL., supra note 6, at 1. ACT criteria include
multidisciplinary staffing, integration of services, low client-staff ratios, and twenty-four
hour access. Id.
179. 2004 MIOCRG ANNUAL REP. TO LEGIS., supra note 7, at 3.
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functioning.' 80  The strategies common to the most successful programs
were interagency collaboration, intensive case management, assistance in
securing housing and government benefits, use of a common center or clinic,
assistance with transportation, and peer support for participants.,81
Unfortunately, most counties exclude offenders sentenced for violent
crimes from their MIOCRG programs. 182 This makes little sense. No
county program needs to account for any mentally ill parolee who is
currently dangerous. Any offender who is still violent will be treated under
existing programs for Mentally Disordered Offenders or the Conditional
Release Program.' s3 Ex-offenders who were sentenced for violent crimes
but who are not currently dangerous need treatment to ensure that they
remain non-violent. In short, offenders with violent criminal histories will
not go away or spontaneously heal themselves; ignoring the problem will not
eliminate it. Denying these offenders care does not make the public safer
but, instead, increases the likelihood of relapse and a return to prison, at
greater societal expense.184
C. Programs Targeting the Mentally Ill Homeless
California has targeted the mentally ill homeless through a variety of state
initiatives, commonly referred to as "AB 2034 programs" after State
Assembly Bill 2034, passed in 2000.185 AB 2034 programs serve, but do not
specifically target, ex-offenders among the homeless mentally ill population,
although a "large number" of participants come "directly out of jail or
prison. ' 86  Over three years, participants in AB 2034 pilot programs
reduced days spent in incarceration by 72.1% and the number of
180. Id. at 4.
181. Id. at 7. Many of these factors track closely with the ACT criteria; see id. at 1.
182. 2005 MIOCRG STATEWIDE EVAL., supra note 6, at 2.
183. See supra notes 138-43 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 137-44, 156-73 and accompanying text (recidivism); see also
infra notes 201-03 and accompanying text (cost savings).
185. STEPHEN MAYBERG, EFFECTIVENESS OF INTEGRATED SERVS. FOR HOMELESS
ADULTS WITH SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESS, at i (2003), http://www.dmh.cahwnet.gov/
Prop 63/MHSA/docs/resource listings/AB2034_may2003.pdf.
186. Id. at 8.
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incarcerations by 45.9%.187 Participants' ability to secure housing was a
foundation for successful treatment. "What has become apparent to most
providers and stakeholders is the therapeutic significance of having a stable
place to live, and the foundation this provides for individuals' ability and
desire to make progress in other aspects of their lives."'
' 88
AB 2034 programs also treat co-occurring substance abuse: 61.9% of
program participants had a co-occurring substance abuse disorder. 189 The
results of the test programs show "that to be effective it is necessary to treat
the mental illness and the substance abuse issues simultaneously rather than
separately."' 90 The program also emphasizes the importance of collecting
data, particularly for outcome-based assessments of effectiveness.
The requirements for data collection and reporting . . . send a
universal message to all ... that what we care about is not limited to
what type of mental health service someone is receiving, but rather
where people are living, whether they are working, avoiding
incarcerations and inappropriate hospitalizations, and generally
improving the quality of their lives.
19 1
Outcome measurements for programs include current housing and
employment, which is an outcome focus unique to this program. 192 As of
2003, AB 2034 programs served 5000 people, about 10% of the estimated
50,000 mentally ill homeless people in California.
193
187. Id. at 10.
188. Id. at 2.
189. Id. at 8.
190. Id.
191. STEPHEN MAYBERG, EFFECTIVENESS OF INTEGRATED SERVS. FOR HOMELESS
ADULTS WITH SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESS, at 22 (2003), http://www.dmh.cahwnet.gov/
Prop_63/MHSA/docs/resource listings/AB2034 may2003.pdf. Note that the importance
of collecting data is addressed to providers of the services. The message of data's
importance "resounds from line staff to program administrator, from county mental
health director to State mental health director, from the Legislature to the Governor." Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 36.
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D. Graduated Sanctions and Harm Reduction
One San Francisco program funded by AB 2034 uses graduated sanctions
within a harm reduction philosophy, recognizing that abstinence from drug
use is the ultimate goal while "acceptling] that not everyone is ready or able
to cease all drug use immediately."' 9 Under harm reduction, drug abuse is
treated according to a disease model, not a criminal one. When a client
relapses, the graduated sanctions approach allows administrators to respond
by adjusting treatment first, rather than immediately revoking parole.,9  As
one program administrator says, "everyone agrees abstinence is the ideal.
But that is not going to happen, so let's not make them flee from
treatment[.]"' 1
96
One method of getting patients to reduce dependence on illegal drugs is to
educate them about symptom management and about the benefits of legal
medications. 197 The theory behind this policy is that many mentally ill
homeless self-medicate through the use of illegal drugs and will make
healthier decisions if they are better informed. Program administrators also
build bridges to the criminal justice system, "which increases the likelihood
that judges will release clients to treatment programs, or probation officers
will defer to case managers [sic] treatment recommendations."',
98
California's official parole policies must be amended if harm
reduction and graduated sanctions are to be rolled out on a large-scale basis.
Parole officers are currently constrained by regulations and policies in their
ability to participate in such programs, because officers are still officially
required to report certain offenses. 199 Parole officers are also hindered by
the prospect of legal liability, which affects their willingness and ability to
bend the rules for a given client.2 ° ° State indemnification of parole officers
who participate in certain programs might improve treatment outcomes.
194. SHIELD, supra note 141, at 5.
195. Id. at7.
196. Id. at 6.
197. Id. at 6-7.
198. Id. at 8-9.
199. Id. at 10; see, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15 § 2616 (2006).
200. PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME, supra note 141, at 85-86.
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Savings from implementing graduated sanctions could pay for
indemnification.20 1 The 2003 Little Hoover report on parole recommended
both graduated sanctions and shorter revocation sentences as a way of
cutting costs "without jeopardizing public safety." 20 2 Treating drug abuse
with graduated sanctions was estimated to save $151 million immediately,
while reducing the average revocation sentence from 140 days to 100 days
was estimated to save $300 million per year.20
3
V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Without a change in the culture of the CDCR health care system, policy
recommendations are meaningless. The problems with California prison
health care in general, and mental health care in particular, are both well
documented and well entrenched. No policy recommendation has the power
to reform the system. Any attempt to fix the unconstitutional and
embarrassing state of the prison mental health care system must begin by
repairing the system's culture of failure. Once the CDCR's culture of failure
is replaced with accountability and responsibility, the state must implement
several specific changes: (1) some form of diversion from the penal system;
(2) flexible, fully-funded, coordinated provision of care in prisons, including
information systems and managerial oversight designed to ensure
compliance with standards of care; (3) an expansion of programs targeting
the mentally ill and specific subgroups therein; and (4) an expansion of post-
release programs as outlined above.
A. Promote Alternatives to Prison
Because people with mental illness tend to do poorly in prison,204 all
efforts should be made to divert them from incarceration where practical.
These efforts should include implementation of programs encouraging
diversion from the criminal justice system, expansion of treatment resources
outside the penal context, and, perhaps most radically, treatment of mental
illness as a public health problem regardless of whether the person with
mental illness is in prison or not.
Diversion saves money and improves outcomes. California can
either spend taxpayers' money incarcerating the mentally ill or spend the
201. LrTLE HOOVER, supra note 137, at iii.
202. Id.
203. Id. These figures are for parolees in general, not just mentally ill parolees.
204. See supra notes 10-18 and accompanying text.
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same amount to serve more patients more effectively in a non-penal context.
Whenever the mentally ill come into contact with the criminal justice
system, diversion should always be an option. Police should be trained to
de-escalate conflicts with the mentally ill and should be encouraged to refer
the individuals they encounter to the Department of Mental Health (DMH).
Furthermore, 911-emergency dispatchers should also send trained mental
health professionals to respond to calls believed to have a mental health
component. 205 Before trial, courts should consider diverting mentally ill
defendants from prosecution into treatment, or from criminal court to a
mental health court.206 Mental health courts in particular, by combining law
enforcement and social services in a therapeutic approach, have proven
particularly effective. 207 According to the California court system, as of
2002, thirteen trial court systems had established mental health courts;
20 8
additional courts will be funded as a result of Proposition 63.209
Non-penal forms of mental health treatment must receive greater
resources than they do now if diversion is to work. "The non-penal mental
health infrastructure has shrunk dramatically over the past 50 years.
2 10
California's mental health treatment system began to atrophy during the
1950s, when the deinstitutionalization movement proposed to treat people
with mental illness in the least restrictive setting.2 11 From 1955 to 1994, the
population of mentally ill patients in California state hospitals dropped
205. See COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'TS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE/MENTAL HEALTH CONSENSUS
PROJECT, 36-38 (2002), http://consensusproject.org/downloads/Entire-report.pdf.
206. See id. at 82-89.
207. Id. at 88.
208. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., MENTAL HEALTH COURTS: OF CURRENT INTEREST
(2007), http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/collab/mental.htm.
209. See infra notes 220-26 and accompanying text.
210. E. Fuller Torrey & Mary T. Zdanowicz, Deinstitutionalization Hasn 't Worked,
WASH. POST, July 9, 1999, at A29 ("[W]e have lost effectively 93 percent of our state
psychiatric hospital beds since 1955.").
211. See generally E. FULLER TORREY, OUT OF THE SHADOWS: CONFRONTING
AMERICA'S MENTAL ILLNESS CRISIS 34 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1997).
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89.8%.212 Adjusting for the boom in California's population over that time
and assuming steady rates of mental illness, the current inpatient population
213is 96% smaller than it was in 1955. In other words, 96% of people who
would have received inpatient treatment in state mental hospitals in 1955
must now turn elsewhere. 214 Where do they go?
Some observers refer to the "balloon theory" of mental illness treatment-
that is, by pushing down on one part of the balloon, i.e., reducing
hospitalization, the needs of people with mental illness merely arise in a
215different location, i.e., prison. Untreated mental illness may manifest
itself in behavioral problems that result in arrest and imprisonment, 216 and
often, the only treatment available is in jail. Anecdotal reports indicate that
judges sometimesput the mentally ill in prison to give them access to mental
health services. 21  This might explain why extreme recidivism among
inmates (those inmates with eleven or more prior offenses) is twice as high
for the mentally ill.2 18 Ironically, a deinstitutionalization policy borne of a
desire to treat the mentally ill using the least restrictive alternative now
219places them in the most restrictive environment possible. Ultimately,
212. The New Asylums, Deinstitutionalization: A Psychiatric Titanic, FRONTLINE,
2005, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/asylums/special/excerpt.html
(citing generally TORREY, supra note 211).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See Raphel & Stoll, supra note 2, at 46 (citing Lionel Penrose, "Mental Disease
and Crime: Outline of a Comparative Study of European Statistics," 18 BRIT. J. MED.
PSYCHOLOGY 1 (1933)). Raphael and Stoll are skeptical of this theory, however, citing
the different demographics of the deinstitutionalized population and the inmate
population. Id. at 47-49.
216. Kanapaux, supra note 8, at 2.
217. See id. at 6; see also The New Asylums, Some Frequently Asked Questions,
FRONTLINE, 2005 http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/asylums/etc/faq.htm
(quoting Reginald Wilkinson, head of the Ohio prison system: "I've actually had a judge
mention to me before that, 'We hate to do this, but we know the person will get treated if
we send this person to prison."').
218. See The New Asylums, Some Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 217.
219. This phenomenon-the transition from inpatient treatment in hospitals to
incarcerated treatment in prisons-is known as transinstitutionalization. See Ralph
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diversion into treatment will work only if greater resources are devoted to
non-penal alternatives.
Money generated by various state and federal initiatives may be a path to
obtain greater resources for mentally ill offenders. Proposition 63, passed by
California voters in November 2004 and codified as the Mental Health
Services Act (MHSA), raises money for the treatment of the mentally ill via
a tax on Californians with incomes exceeding $1 million. 20 The MHSA
provides funding in excess of $600 million a year,22 1 equivalent to a 26%
increase over current funding levels.222 It is unclear to what extent MISA
funds could be used for mentally ill offenders. While MHSA programs may
not provide services to state prisoners and parolees, 223 one of the specific
goals articulated in the MHSA's "Vision Statement" is collaboration with
"local resources such as ... law enforcement and criminal justice
systems," 224 and reducing "negative effects of untreated mental illness
including reductions in . . . incarceration .... ,,225 Mentally ill people with
criminal justice involvement are a priority population for several counties;
however, the Department of Mental Health requires that MHSA funds be
used in jails and juvenile justice facilities "only for services that facilitate
discharge. ' 226  In the summer of 2007, State Senator Darrell Steinberg
introduced a bill that would fund programs that "identify and treat offenders'
Slovenko, The Transinstitutionalization of the Mentally Ill, 29 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 641,
641 (2003).
220. Initiative Measure (Prop. 63, approved Nov. 2, 2004), Mental Health Services
Act of 2004, available at http://www.dmh.ca.gov/Prop_63/MHSA/docs/
MentalHealthServicesActFull Text.pdf.
221. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., supra note 208, at 1.
222. See Kara Zivin Bambauer, Proposition 63: Should Other States Follow
California's Lead?, 56 PSYCHIATRIC SERv. 642, 642 (June 2005).
223. Into the Mind of an Inmate, S.F. CHRON., May 25, 2007, at B12.
224. VISION STATEMENT AND GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR DMH IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
MHSA, 3 (2005), http://www.dmh.cahwnet.gov/Prop_63/MHSA/docs/Vision-and_
GuidingPrinciples_2-16-05.pdf.
225. Id. at 4.
226. MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ACT IMPLEMENTATION STUDY: PHASE II, 5-6 (Nov.
2007), http://www.dmh.ca.gov/Prop_63/MHSA/docs/CSSImplementationPhase2Exec
Sum.pdf.
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mental-health problems from the time of their conviction through their
227 228parole period." The bill was vetoed in January of 2008.
Increased resources alone will not increase rates of treatment. California
must also reconsider its civil commitment laws, which currently make it
difficult for local officials to force a person with mental illness to get
treatment. The Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS) enables the state to
commit individuals adjudged to be either a danger to others or "gravely
disabled"-unable to provide food, clothing, and shelter for themselves-as
a result of mental illness.229 Commitment, known as a conservatorship, lasts
for a year. Conservatorships can be renewed but, if challenged by the
patient, must be supported in court with updated diagnoses. The LPS
provides important civil rights to the mentally ill, but limits treatment. First,
the law enables individuals to refuse treatment even if they might be too
mentally ill to exercise sound judgment (making "voluntary" refusals to
230
accept treatment potentially more suspect). Second, the law permits
commitment only after the illness has reached a crisis point.231 Intermediate
treatment for those unable to consent is needed.
We do not tell cancer patients to come back if and when their disease
has metastasized. But we turn mental health clients away and tell
them to return when their symptoms are so severe and persistent that
they cannot meet their own needs, and may no longer recognize that
they even need care.
232
227. Into the Mind of an Inmate, supra note 223.
228. Bill information, http://info.sen.ca.gov/cgi-bin/postquery?billnumber-sb_851&
sess=CUR&house=B&site=sen (last visited Mar. 5, 2008).
229. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5000-5129 (West 1998).
230. Advance directives about mental health care can preserve individual preferences
about treatment even when an individual is too incapacitated to express them. See John
Monahan et al., Mandated Community Treatment for Mental Disorder, HEALTH AFFAIRS
34 (Sept.-Oct. 2003).
231. CAL. TREATMENT ADVOCACY COALITION, FACT SHEET: TALKING POINTS-WHY
LPS MUST BE REFORMED, http://www.psychlaws.org/StateActivity/California/
factsheetl.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2008).
232. LITTLE HOOVER, supra note 137, at iii.
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Ironically, mentally ill people cannot be forced into civil confinement and
given treatment, but, if their mental illness results in criminal behavior, they
can lose both their liberty and their best chance for effective treatment.
Perhaps the most radical reform would be to treat mental illness as a
public health problem, regardless of the criminal status of those involved.
This approach would encompass graduated sanctions and harm reduction in
parole, but would extend to other factors as well. For example, Medi-Cal
and Medicaid provide medical care to indigent populations. If a Medi-Cal or
Medicaid recipient goes to prison, he or she is unenrolled, treated in prison,
and re-enrolled (if eligible) upon release. If the CDCR were to contract out
healthcare provision to Medi-Cal or Medicaid, mentally ill prisoners would
no longer face medication and therapeutic shortages because they got lost in
the shuffle.
California must move away from certain entrenched ideas to implement
an epidemiological approach. Treating mental illness is a sound investment
in public safety and a sound use of the public fisc, not a luxury. Recent
mental health initiatives, many of which exclude mentally ill offenders,
indicate that there is a great need for leadership and education on this issue.
The mentally ill do not stop being ill once they are incarcerated. People with
mental illness who commit crimes as a result of their illness are not less
deserving or less in need of treatment. Focusing on the treatment needs of
mentally ill offenders does not mean they will be "let off' and released from
prison. California's MDO program, which covers violent mentally ill
prisoners, already protects public safety through its well-established regime
for treating and civilly committing violent mentally ill offenders.
233
B. Implement a Flexible, Fully-Funded, Coordinated Mental Health
Program in Prisons that Uses Data and Management Oversight to Ensure
Quality Care is Provided
The CDCR must make several changes to improve mental health care for
its prisoners. Medical and therapeutic care programs must be flexible
enough to accommodate the diverse needs of prisoners. Funding must be
secured to ensure that prison health care and programming is fully staffed.
Corrections officers must coordinate their priorities with medical treatment.
Finally, information technology and management systems must ensure that
programs achieve positive outcomes.
First, treatment can be improved by decentralizing its provision.
California concentrates mental health treatment in a few facilities, such as
the California Medical Facility in Vacaville (42.3% of inmates are in
twenty-four-hour psychiatric care and receive therapy or counseling and take
psychotropic medications) and the California Institution for Women (46.1%
233. See supra notes 149-55 and accompanying text.
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of inmates in therapy/counseling, 30.7% on psychotropic medications).2 34
Prisoners are less likely to fall through the cracks if they do not have to be
transferred to another prison for treatment. 235 Local treatment would also
facilitate screening prisoners already in custody for late-onset mental illness.
Prison can trigger mental illness in some inmates who do not present
symptoms at the time of intake, and protocols should be developed to ensure
that late-onset mental illness is identified and treated. Local treatment
facilities capable of handling mental illness might provide greater flexibility
to prison administrators and less disruption to mentally ill inmates.
However, added resources must accompany decentralization-local prisons
cannot be told to shoulder more of the treatment load without the money
necessary to staff and equip treatment centers.
Second, the state must provide more resources for mental health treatment
and programming in prison. The mentally ill, once imprisoned, do not get
the care that they need, but a collateral effect of resource scarcity is that
there are fewer resources to address inmates with non-acute psychological
needs. "[I]nmates who need treatment for lesser problems, such as anger
management and borderline personality disorders, rarely get it. That
contributes to the great stress within the prison, and it frustrates inmates'
opportunities for parole. 236 One ingenious solution proposed to deal with
staffing shortages is to require recipients of state medical education grants
(or reduced rates on student loans) to agree to work in prison health care for
a set period of time. 237  In addition to providing needed services, the
community at large would benefit as young doctors returned from their
prison residencies with firsthand knowledge of what is really happening
inside California's prisons.
Third, health care providers should enlist COs to be the first line of
treatment for mentally ill prisoners. COs should receive more support and
training for dealing with mentally ill prisoners, including training on mental
health symptomology and pharmaceutical treatment. Currently, any
disciplinary report for a prisoner receiving mental health treatment must be
reviewed by a clinician to see whether the prisoner's mental illness
234. BECK BJS STUDY, supra note 3, at 7.
235. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
236. Sterngold, supra note 99, at A16.
237. NIETO, supra note 33, at 48.
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contributed to the misbehavior.238  But the state should go further.
Jurisdictions outside California have experimented with different ways of
imposing discipline on mentally ill prisoners. In Utah, inmates are not
punished for behavior that is related to or is the result of a mental illness,
and Alabama does not punish "symptoms of a serious mental illness." 239 In
Ohio, mental illness testimony does not tend to exonerate prisoners from
discipline-related sanctions but often results in a suspended sentence.
240
Finally, the state's information technology and data collection need to be
revamped to accurately diagnose and manage mental health treatment. More
patient data need to be standardized and shared, both within the prison
system and among social service providers. Data integration would avoid
duplication of effort, which would save needed resources. Better data would
also ensure that prisoners would get treatment when they need it. The
CDCR's inadequate data collection and analysis241 has "plagued" its ability
242to engage in adequate long-range planning.
Jails and prisons in particular must integrate their data, since many
prisoners migrate between the two systems. The State should fund mental
health screenings in county jails to standardize the information collected and
243to eliminate the need for duplicate tests at reception centers.
Standardizing information would also help establish and maintain effective
release programs.
244
Prescription information and drug supplies must accompany prisoners
whenever they are transferred between jails and prisons, different parts of
the prison system, and when they are released into parole. Medicated
prisoners should take identical medication whenever transferred. Although a
single diagnosis can be addressed by many drugs, side effects can be
238. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15 § 3317 (2006).
239. Michael Krelstein, The Role of Mental Health in the Inmate Disciplinary
Process: A National Survey, 30 J AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 488, 494 (2002), available
at http://www.jaapl.org/cgi/reprint/30/4/488.
240. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED, supra note 3, at 63.
241. Id. at6.
242. Id. at 6 n.4.
243. NIETO, supra note 33, at 47.
244. JOHN MONAHAN, VIOLENCE RISK ASSESSMENT, COMPREHENSIVE HANDBOOK OF
PSYCHOLOGY 25-30 (Feb. 9, 2001) (unpublished, on file with author).
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different. Changing medication may disorient mentally ill prisoners in an
already disorienting environment, interfering with their ability to adjust to
prison.
Ultimately, California needs to track mentally ill county inmates, state
prisoners, and parolees across jurisdictions and integrate treatment. The
State could insert mental health information into one of the existing criminal
justice databases, such as the Parole Automated Tracking System or the
California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (which tracks
criminals across jurisdictional lines). 245 Alternatively, the state could apply
for funds from the National Criminal History Improvement Program to
computerize criminal history records and include mental health fields in the
resulting database. 246  Regardless, any attempt to reform the state's
antediluvian correctional information technology must standardize databases
and have a central administrator oversee the project, as recommended in
2472004 by the Corrections Independent Review Panel.
C. Tailor Programs to the Mentally Ill Population
Mentally ill prisoners need more programs, and alternatives to standard
policies, where appropriate, should be developed. The CDCR should
consider the possibility of separate housing for the mentally ill, separate
disciplinary procedures, and an expansion of tailored post-release programs.
Furthermore, California should tailor programs to individual subpopulations
of mentally ill prisoners, particularly female prisoners with mental illness.
Prison officials need to identify which programs for the general
population are particularly effective for the mentally ill and enroll mentally
ill prisoners in them. At the same time, officials should adapt existing non-
penal mentally ill programming for use in correctional environments. These
programs must address not only post-release needs (self-care, job skills,
information about federal and state post-release programs) but deeper
psychological needs as well. Some programs should specifically target
prisoners with co-occurring drug and alcohol abuse, since their rate of
245. NIETO, supra note 33, at 47.
246. PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME, supra note 141, at 108. Given that
many states make criminal records publicly available online, however, there might be
medical privacy issues under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996. Id.
247. See REPORT OF THE CORRECTIONS INDEPENDENT REVIEW PANEL, supra note 98, at
121-22.
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recidivism is much higher than that of either the mentally ill or the general
prison populations. Other programs should target mentally ill prisoners with
histories of emotional, physical, and sexual abuse, to address the legacy of
abuse and help prisoners avoid becoming abusers themselves.
The CDCR needs to modify its approach to safety, discipline, and housing
to reflect the reality of mentally ill prisoners. First, mentally ill prisoners are
more likely to be victimized by other inmates and also more likely to violate
prison rules. The result in both cases is often solitary confinement, 24 either
as punishment or protective custody. Given the harsh, decompensating
effects of solitary confinement, officials should develop alternative
punishments or ensure that therapy and drug treatment continue throughout
administrative segregation. Second, the mentally ill should be housed
according to their particular diagnoses and treatment. Some inmates should
not be housed with the general population, both for their safety and for the
safety of those around them. Others might benefit from a regime in which
somewhat less traditional disciplinary rules prevail, avoiding a cycle of
violations and solitary confinement without sacrificing officer safety.
The CDCR must also develop and implement programs and staff
training for female mentally ill prisoners. Female prisoners are particularly
susceptible to depression as a result of separation from children and family.
In fact, 10-15% of women entering reception centers suffer from
depression. 249  This population is particularly susceptible to discipline
problems: "female prisoners currently on psychotropic medications had
annual infraction rates that were twice that of other women prisoners-and,
indeed, had higher infraction rates on average than male prisoners who were
also on medication."
250
D. Transform the Culture of Failure
The system needs a major overhaul. All parties with any involvement in
the corrections system need to acknowledge openly that the prison system
has failed for years to provide adequate treatment for mentally ill prisoners.
Every few years, new reports document the lack of record keeping, the
inadequacy of mental health care, and the needless duplication of effort and
expense that goes into the wasteful system. However, nothing seems to
change except the dates on the latest atrocious review of CDCR policies.
Over ten years ago, Coleman described the prison mental health system in
words that could apply with equal force today: "[d]efendants have been
248. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
249. NIETO, supra note 33, at 22.
250. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQuIPPED, supra note 3, at 39.
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confronted repeatedly with plain evidence of real suffering caused by
systemic deficiencies of a constitutional magnitude. Their responses have
frequently occurred only under the pressure of this and other litigation.
251
Litigation has forced the state to address these problems, but reform via the
courts is expensive and removes any discretion from corrections officials.
The state should address these problems proactively. The CDCR could
begin publishing a shame table of the worst facilities, in terms of untreated
prisoners and abuses, or it could provide incentives for honesty in reporting
mental health problems so that accurate information, the predicate to any
solution, can finally be obtained. But throughout eleven years of court
supervision, seventy-seven substantive court orders, and "thousands of
hours" of court-supervised implementation,252 the CDCR has failed to
remedy its constitutionally deficient care. It is therefore with some
frustration that this article is concluded, by noting that none of these
recommendations are particularly novel. The problems have been diagnosed
before. All that is lacking is the administrative skill and political will to
implement them. As the system undergoes another stinging rebuke from the
justice system and a period of receivership, one can hope that lessons will
finally be learned. All the citizens of California, not merely those
incarcerated with mentally illnesses, deserve no less.
251. Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1311 (E.D. Cal. 1995).
252. Coleman v. Schwarzenegger (Coleman II), No. Civ S-90-0520 LKK JFM P,
2007 WL 2122636, at *2-3 (E.D. Cal. July 23, 2007).
